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ABSTRACT
The past few decades have seen an unprecedented rise in international trade and
integration. In addition to increasing trade flows of final goods and services, the
fragmentation of the production process across national borders has resulted in a
rise in trade of intermediate inputs. Countries also continue to expand and deepen
the rules governing international integration in a growing number of areas that have
become standard in modern free trade agreements, such as intellectual property. This
research explores three topics related to international trade in a highly integrated
world, showing that integration has resulted in some quantifiable benefits.
In the first chapter, I examine Western European industries that source intermedi-
ate inputs from lower cost countries in Central and Eastern Europe. I use variation in
foreign sourcing driven by subsidies received by firms in Central and Eastern Europe
to identify the impact on Western European industries. Foreign sourcing is associ-
ated with higher employment, wages per worker and higher skill employment. I also
discuss some of the potential costs, even though I do not attempt to quantify them.
Although every country benefits from foreign sourcing, the gains accrue to countries
that are most involved in regional supply chains.
v
The second chapter analyzes whether restrictive intellectual property provisions
improve or hurt access to biological medicines in Chile, finding that strong provisions
increase both the volume and unit value of imported medicines. The results indicate
that while both a market expansion effect that results in a greater ability to import
and market power effect that raises prices are present, the market expansion effect
dominates.
In the final chapter, I focus on a negative impact of integration, the potential
for imports to surge following job losses in certain occupations during the Great
Recession. I analyze whether changes in an occupation’s employment in a state
resulted in changes in the content of state imports. I find evidence that these changes
might be related, but no causal evidence to suggest that employment changes caused
changes in the content of imports.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Foreign Sourcing and the Productivity
Effect: Evidence from Europe
1.1 Introduction
As global value chains expanded in the 1990s and 2000s, trade in intermediate goods
increased dramatically. Trade in intermediate goods contributed around 50 percent
to the growth in total manufacturing goods trade from 1995 to 2014 (Degain, Meng
and Wang, 2017). Cross border flows of intermediate services were also significant
drivers of total trade in services. Trade in intermediate goods and services is different
than trade in final goods in that imports of intermediates are meant for further
domestic production. Although any type of imports can displace workers involved in
the production of import-competing products, imports of intermediate inputs from
lower cost locations have the potential to decrease costs and increase employment
in the industries importing the intermediates, a result known in the literature as
the productivity effect. In this paper, I analyze the productivity effect in Western
European industries that import intermediates from Central and Eastern Europe.
In 2004 and 2007, over ten Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries joined
the European Union. Membership in the European Union allowed CEE countries
to deepen international trade ties with Western European countries through the free
trade area and harmonization of trade policies, leading to lower trade costs in the
region. In addition to lower trade costs, less corruption and availability of better con-
2tracts in modernizing CEE countries also contributed to the rise in Western European
sourcing of intermediates from Central and Eastern Europe during this time (Marin,
2006). From 2000 to 2014, Western European imports of intermediate inputs from
ten Central and Eastern European countries rose from $45 billion to $267 billion, an
increase of 497 percent.1 Total imports of intermediates into Western Europe rose by
only 158 percent in the same period, from $1.4 trillion in 2000 to $3.5 trillion in 2014.
Since joining the European Union, Central and Eastern European countries rep-
resent increasingly important sources of intermediates for Western Europe. CEE
countries have several benefits over countries such as China and India. The region
offers an educated workforce, cultural and language similarities, proximity to Western
Europe and integration into EU institutions, but with lower costs than in Western
Europe. These benefits have made CEE countries a middle of the road location for
offshore business activity from Western Europe, attracting higher skill industries than
Asia while retaining lower costs than Western Europe. Bellak et al. (2008) empha-
size the importance of labor cost in CEE countries as a motivating factor in sourcing
decisions of multinational firms. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, for ex-
ample, are top exporters of IT and business services (Gal, 2011). Other industries
in Central and Eastern Europe that participate in global supply chains are high tech
and automobile manufacturing and banking and financial services.
With the entry into the European Union of CEE countries in the mid 2000s,
Western European industries could more easily source intermediates from regional
partners in CEE countries, deepening intra-regional supply chains. In this paper, I
analyze the impact on Western European industries of sourcing intermediate inputs
from CEE countries. My identification strategy makes use of a Western European
industry’s exposure to subsidies received by firms in Central and Eastern Europe.
1The ten CEE countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
3Subsidies lower the cost of sourcing from Central and Eastern Europe and are ex-
ogenous to labor market conditions in Western European industries, allowing me to
identify the impact of foreign sourcing on employment and wages in industries in
twelve Western European countries. I provide evidence that the productivity effect
results in increases in employment and wages per worker in Western European in-
dustries. This result suggests that participation in regional supply chains has been
beneficial to Western Europe. I also show that foreign sourcing is associated with
higher skill employment in Western Europe.
1.2 Literature Review
The empirical literature on trade and employment generally finds import competition
from low wage countries has led to a displacement of workers and negative impacts on
firm survival in developed countries, particularly in manufacturing sectors. Bernard,
Jenson and Schott (2006) examine exposure to imports from low wage countries, find-
ing negative impacts on plant survival and growth and increased industry switching
from plants facing competition from low wage countries. Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013) and Pierce and Schott (2016), both of which study the rise in U.S. imports
from China, identify sizable negative effects on U.S. manufacturing employment in
locations exposed to an influx of Chinese goods.
In Denmark, Utar (2018) finds a negative impact on earnings and employment
of manufacturing workers resulting from Chinese import competition. The impact
on manufacturing workers is significant enough to cause continued job instability in
the services sector among those services workers with manufacturing specific training.
In a study of eight Western European countries, Colantone, Coucke and Sleuwaegen
(2015) find imports from low wage countries in Asia and Africa result in increased
exit from manufacturing industries for large firms.
4Several papers examine the potential for differential impacts of imports on employ-
ment. The trade in tasks model of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) disentangles
the displacement effect due to import competition from a productivity effect that re-
sults from cost savings from trade. Ottaviano et al. (2013) and Wright (2014) build
on the task framework in different applications and show gains in employment from
the productivity effect are non-trivial. Wang et al. (2018) show imported interme-
diates from China can actually boost U.S. employment in downstream industries,
particularly for non-manufacturing industries. Gains from the productivity effect are
not limited to employment. Amiti and Wei (2009) analyze services offshoring, finding
that offshoring in the manufacturing sector has a positive impact on total factor and
labor productivity. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) do separate out a positive em-
ployment shock resulting from increased demand for U.S. exports in China as Chinese
incomes rise, but do not explicitly examine a productivity effect resulting from cost
savings from trade.
The evidence on whether multinationals experience a productivity effect is mixed.
In a study of U.S. multinationals, Boehm, Flaaen and Pandalai-Nayar (2017) docu-
ment U.S. multinationals’ disproportionately large contribution to the overall decline
in manufacturing employment and find imported intermediates substitute for U.S.
employment in establishments that become part of a multinational. Kovak, Oldenski
and Sly (2017), on the other hand, find the expansion of foreign affiliates, measured
by an increase in foreign affiliate employment, raises U.S. employment. The evidence
in Kovak, Oldenski and Sly (2017) suggests growth along the intensive margin of
existing multinational plants may benefit employment in the parent country, while
the results from Boehmn, Flaaen and Pandalai-Nayar (2017) show extensive margin
growth of multinational plants may result in a decline in employment.
When the productivity effect does result in job creation, several places in the
5literature suggest that new jobs might be biased towards higher skill occupations
involved in innovation or highly technical work. Becker et al. (2013) find empirical
evidence that offshoring is associated with a shift towards more non-routine tasks and
a higher educated onshore workforce for German multinationals. In simple North-
South models of global production, such as in Feenstra and Hanson (1996), firms
in skill abundant countries in the North source the production of their least skill-
intensive tasks from low skill countries in the South. This offshoring of production
raises the relative skill intensity of production activity in both the North and South
and increases the wage of high skill workers in both locations. In a more nuanced
model of global sourcing such as Arkolakis et al. (2017), firms face a tradeoff between
locating production at home close to consumers or abroad where production costs are
lower. Countries that specialize in innovation (the high skill activity) import from
countries that specialize in production (the low skill activity).
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, I add to the
small body of existing evidence on the productivity effect by showing that imported
intermediate inputs from industries in Central and Eastern Europe have a positive
impact on employment and wages per worker in the offshoring industries in twelve
Western European countries. Second, I provide further evidence that foreign sourc-
ing from Central and Eastern Europe is associated with higher skill employment in
Western European industries.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
I focus on the impact of imports of intermediates from ten Eastern and Central Eu-
ropean countries on employment and wages in industries in twelve Western European
countries. The 28 countries of the European Union were grouped into a high income
Western Europe group and a group of CEE countries based on data availability and
6a country’s GDP per capita in 2014.2Western European countries considered in this
analysis are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The group of Central and
Eastern European countries are those medium to large economies that entered the
European Union in 2004 and 2007 and is comprised of Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
As is the case with many empirical analyses of trade and labor, ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions of industry employment or wages on the value of imported
intermediates will produce biased coefficients that do not accurately represent the
impact of foreign sourcing, necessitating a more robust identification strategy. For-
eign sourcing of intermediates and employment are likely endogenously determined,
making it difficult to estimate the causal effect of foreign sourcing of intermediates on
employment and wages with OLS, if any effect exists. Additionally, the possibility of
unobservables that cannot be controlled for or data measurement errors warrant an
identification strategy that is more robust than OLS.
I use two stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable regression to establish
a causal link between foreign sourcing and employment, as is common in the trade
and labor empirical literature. My identification strategy makes use of detailed data
on subsidies received by firms in the ten CEE countries to construct the exposure
of a Western European industry to lower-cost imported intermediates through the
presence of subsidies in the Central and Eastern European industries producing the
intermediate. Specifically, I exploit the variation in exposure to CEE subsidies among
Western European industries, which drives differences in an industry’s imported in-
termediates. I describe below the nature of and motives behind industry aid such as
2The GDP per capita criteria was used to ensure all countries in the Western Europe group had
higher incomes than the lower income, lower wage Central and Eastern Europe group. The GDP
per capita criteria ultimately excluded countries such as Greece and Portugal that are traditionally
part of Western Europe.
7subsidies in CEE countries and argue that subsidies are shocks to Western European
imports of intermediates that are exogenous to labor markets in Western European
industries. I then describe the subsidy data used and the construction of the sub-
sidy exposure instrument that allows me to cleanly identify the impact of imports
of intermediates on employment and wages in Western European industries in 2SLS
estimation.
1.3.1 Industry aid in Central and Eastern Europe
The European Union tracks aid given to industries by member states in the form
of grants, tax breaks, loans and other instruments. Table 1.1 provides a breakdown
of non-crisis aid to industry by method for the ten Central and Eastern European
economies. For all countries, grants are the largest form of aid to industries, ranging
from an annual average of 13 million euro in Estonia to nearly 1.8 billion euro in
Poland, followed by tax breaks.
Table 1.1: State aid to industries by instrument, annual average 2009-
2011 (million euro)
Grants Tax reduction Equity Soft loans Guarantees
Bulgaria 18 7 0 0 0
Czech Republic 753 113 0 6 100
Estonia 13 3 0 0 0
Hungary 803 488 1 24 5
Latvia 36 15 1 1 0
Lithuania 95 13 1 0 0
Poland 1,777 747 17 38 1
Romania 219 2 4 3 0
Slovakia 115 106 0 0 0
Slovenia 308 6 1 2 0
Source: European Commission State Aid Scoreboard, 2012 Update
Many Central and Eastern European countries offer investment incentive programs
aimed at creating a business environment that is both accessible and profitable to for-
eigners (Ginevicius and Simelyte, 2011). Pecuniary or non-pecuniary aid to industries
in Central or Eastern Europe, however, does not need to be tied to a larger invest-
8ment incentive program. A 2012 European Commission study on non-financial sector
industry aid found the three main objectives driving aid across all European Union
member states were regional development, environmental reasons and research, de-
velopment and innovation.3 These objectives suggest the motives for industry aid
are driven by domestic economic goals, e.g. aid given to auto parts manufacturers
in Poland is primarily given to further domestic economic goals such as boosting
research and development in the auto sector in Poland. Aid is not given with the
aim of influencing economic conditions in foreign industries that may be investing in
and importing from auto parts manufacturers in Poland. The motives of aid to CEE
industries therefore can be seen as exogenous to labor markets in Western European
industries.
1.3.2 Subsidy data
I use data on subsidies received by firms in ten CEE countries from the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank’s Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS).4 The BEEPS is a firm-level survey
covering topics related to the business environment in a country. I use data from
four rounds of the BEEPS (2002, 2005, 2009 and 2012). In each round, the BEEPS
asked firms about the subsidies received from local, national or supranational govern-
ment or other sources over the past three years: “Over the last 36 months has your
firm received any subsidies from the national government, EU sources, regional/local
governments or any other sources?”
In some but not all years, the BEEPS requires firms answer the question separately
for subsidies received by national, regional/local and EU sources. Some years also
contain the firm’s answer to the amount of subsidies received as a percent of the
3European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Facts and figures on State aid in
the EU Member States, 2012 Update
4For more information about the BEEPS, see https://ebrd-beeps.com/
9average sales during this period.
Figure 1·1: Share of firms receiving subsidies, average across indus-
tries
To maximize the number of years of data I am able to use, I do not use reported
data on the amount or source of subsidies received. Instead, I create a binary variable
for each firm that is equal to one if the firm reported receiving a subsidy from any
source for survey year t or zero if the firm does not report receiving a subsidy. I
then construct Subsidymjt, the share of firms in industry m in CEE country j that
report in BEEPS year t that they received subsidies at some point in the last three
years. Firms in the BEEPS report the ISIC industry that is their primary industry.
I convert the ISIC codes to the industries used in the World Input-Output Tables
(WIOT), the data source of trade flows of intermediates in this paper.5
Figure 1·1 plots the share of firms receiving subsidies, averaged across industries,
5The list of industries in the WIOT can be found at http://www.wiod.org/home.
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in the ten CEE economies for 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2012. In most countries, the share
jumps up and down from one BEEPs year to another rather than display a smooth
trend. When comparing the share in 2002 and 2012, some countries experience a large
increase in the share of firms receiving subsidies, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland, while others like Bulgaria and Slovenia experience small declines over
the decade. Most countries see a slowdown in the subsidy share in 2009, likely related
to the global financial crisis.
The BEEPS data is somewhat opaque in that the survey does not contain a
uniform definition of a subsidy and so whether a firm answers yes to the BEEPS
question depends on the the individual firm’s perception of what constitutes a subsidy.
Because the aggregate data on types of industry aid seen in Table 1.1 indicate the
most prevalent form of aid in CEE countries are grants followed by tax breaks, it is
a reasonable assumption that most firms have in mind an aid instrument such as a
grant or tax break when answering the BEEPS question.
1.3.3 World Input-Output Tables (WIOT)
Trade flows of intermediate inputs by industry and supplier country come from the
World Input-Output Database (WIOD). The WIOD provides a World Input-Output
Table (WIOT) covering international and domestic flows of 56 products into 61 indus-
tries and end use categories for 43 countries and a rest of world aggregate. The WIOT
data are available from 2000 to 2014.6 Using data from the WIOT, it is possible to
look at an industry’s global and domestic sourcing of intermediates. For example,
the WIOT provide data on an industry’s (e.g. the US pharmaceutical industry) in-
ternational sourcing of intermediate goods (e.g. chemicals sourced from China) and
services (e.g. accounting services sourced from the United Kingdom), as well as data
on the industry’s domestic sourcing. Because the WIOT data capture international
6More information on the construction of the WIOT can be found in Dietzenbacher et al. (2013).
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sourcing of both goods and services, the data present a complete picture of what
intermediate goods and services an industry acquires from overseas unlike traditional
trade data, which does not include trade in services or differentiate between imports
of intermediate versus final goods.
The WIOT data do not, however, differentiate between intra-firm trade done by
multinationals and arms-length trade done by firms that are unrelated. Although
both forms of trade are considered offshoring because an intermediate input crosses
international borders, there might be important implications on labor markets from
different types of trade. For the purposes of this paper, which analyzes the impact on
employment of all foreign sourcing from the lower-wage CEE that a Western European
industry undertakes, the lack of distinction between different types of trade is not a
significant limitation.
Figure 1·2 shows a simplified example of the flows of intermediate inputs available
in the WIOT for two supplier countries (j1 and j2) and one final goods producing
country (k). Countries j1 and j2 each produce two intermediate inputs (m1 and m2).
Country k has two finals goods industries (i1 and i2) that import intermediate m1
and m2 from both supplier countries for use in production along with domestically
produced varieties of intermediate inputs m1 and m2. All lines in Figure 1·2 represent
flows of intermediate inputs available in the WIOT data. Flows in blue are flows of
imports from intermediate input producer m in country j to industry i in country k.
Flows in green are flows of domestically produced intermediate inputs from producer
m to industry i in country k.
I use the WIOT data to construct the value of all foreign sourcing of intermediates
from the group of CEE countries done by industry i in Western European country k,
ForeignSourcingikt. Table 1.2 shows the value of foreign sourcing of intermediates
from the ten CEE countries for each Western European country for 2002 and 2012.
12
Figure 1·2: Intermediate input flows in WIOT
Foreign sourcing increased significantly for all Western European countries. Germany
experienced the largest level increase, a change of over $700 billion. Foreign sourc-
ing from CEE countries increased by the greatest percent in small countries such as
Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, perhaps because they were able to allocate
scarce land to its most valuable use by substituting imported intermediates for do-
mestic production. Because the WIOT data do not distinguish between intra-firm
and arms-length trade, it is not possible to know whether the increases in foreign
sourcing seen in Table 1.2 are driven by multinational activity or regular trade.
1.3.4 Employment and additional industry data
Data on employment and wages on the twelve Western European countries in this
analysis (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United King-
dom, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden) for the years 2000-2014 come from Eu-
rostat. I also use several other data series from Eurostat: an industry’s gross capital
13
Table 1.2: Foreign Sourcing from CEE countries, billion $
2002 2012
Austria 53.7 199.6
Belgium 19.5 122.3
Denmark 15.1 63.0
Finland 9.3 47.6
France 46.8 202.4
Germany 264.8 979.1
Ireland 3.0 23.5
Italy 55.2 225.2
Netherlands 20.8 111.3
Spain 21.2 82.0
Sweden 19.8 102.3
United Kingdom 40.2 182.5
Source: WIOT
formation, industry turnover and a country’s unemployment rate. All Eurostat data
were mapped from the NACE Rev 1.1 and Rev. 2 industries they were reported in
to the industries in the WIOT. It is a straightforward mapping from NACE to ISIC
rev. 4, the classification of the WIOT data.
Data on the number of low-, medium- and high-skilled employees comes from the
EU Labour Force Survey and were downloaded from the International Labor Orga-
nization (ILO). These data are only available at an aggregated industry level rep-
resenting agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining and two services sectors.
WIOT sectors were mapped into these aggregate sectors for the skill level analysis.
1.3.5 Exposure of Western European industries to CEE subsidies
I construct a Western European industry’s exposure to CEE subsidies. Because sub-
sidized intermediates likely are lower cost than unsubsidized intermediates, a higher
exposure to subsidized intermediates from CEE should result in greater sourcing of
intermediates for a Western European industry. To construct the subsidy exposure
of an industry in a Western European country, I combine information on the sub-
sidy share of CEE industries with data on the use of the subsidized intermediates in
production in Western European industries. SubsidyExposureikt gives a measure of
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exposure of industry i in Western European country k to subsidized intermediates
from CEE. A Western European industry’s subsidy exposure is constructed using a
Bartik-like sum of the share of firms receiving a subsidy in a CEE industry multiplied
by the share of use of the intermediate in the Western European industry.
SubsidyExposureikt =
∑
j
∑
m
Usemijkt∑
m
∑
j Usemijkt
∗ Subsidymjt (1.1)
where Subsidymjt is the share of firms producing intermediate m in Eastern European
country j that report receiving a subsidy in BEEPs year t and
Usemijkt∑
m
∑
j Usemijkt
is the share of intermediate m from Eastern European country j used in production
of industry i in Western European country k in the year 2000. The denominator
includes the use of domestically produced intermediate m in addition to all imported
intermediates.
SubsidyExposureikt is larger when the share of firms producing m that report
receiving a subsidy in CEE country j is high and/or when the subsidized intermediate
m is important in production in industry i in country k, i.e. has a high use share.
Table 1.3: Variation in SubsidyExposureikt
SubExp SubExp SubExp SubExp SubExp SubExp
Adj. R squared 0.03 0.50 0.13 0.61 0.73 0.62
F stat 4.95 31.03 62.52 37.30 24.19 27.93
Country FE Yes No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No No No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No No No No Yes No
Obs. 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282
Table 1.3 reports an adjusted R squared and F statistic from regressions of the
variable SubsidyExposureikt on a number of fixed effects to determine which di-
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mensions drive variation in an industry’s exposure. The majority of variation in
SubsidyExposureikt comes from the industry i dimension, suggesting Western Euro-
pean industries differ greatly in their exposure to CEE subsidized intermediates. Very
little variation in SubsidyExposureikt comes from the Western European country k
dimension. This pattern of sourcing strategies for intermediates differing among in-
dustries but being similar across Western European countries could be due to several
reasons. CEE countries may specialize in different types of intermediates, resulting in
the French auto industry sourcing from the set same of CEE countries as the German
auto industry but from a different set of CEE countries as the French or German
IT industries. Additionally, there might be a common set of intermediates receiving
the majority of subsidies in all CEE countries, so that the French auto industry will
have a similar exposure to subsidies as its German counterpart, regardless of the CEE
countries from which it sources, as long as the French and German auto industries
use a similar mix of intermediates that differs from those used in the countries’ IT
industries.
1.3.6 First Stage
I use SubsidyExposureikt to instrument for a Western European industry’s imports
of intermediates from CEE countries, ForeignSourcingikt. For SubsidyExposureikt
to be a valid instrument, it is necessary to assume that there are no unobservables
that covary with the share of firms receiving subsidies in CEE countries that also
affect labor markets in the Western European industries sourcing from them. First
stage regression results presented below show that an industry’s subsidy exposure is
strongly positively correlated with its foreign sourcing.
In the first stage, I regress ForeignSourcingikt on the industry’s exposure to CEE
subsidies, SubsidyExposureikt, fixed effects for Western European country k, industry
i and year t and controls, seen in equation 1.2. Equation 1.2 is a panel regression in
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Figure 1·3: First stage
the industry-country (ik) dimension for the four years of BEEPS data, 2002, 2005,
2009 and 2012. All variables are in logs. Controls included in X′B are an industry’s
capital intensity defined as gross capital formation divided by turnover (sales) and a
country’s unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-country
level.
ln(ForeignSourcingikt) = α + βln(SubsidyExposureikt) + µk + ρi + δt + X
′B + eikt
(1.2)
SubsidyExposureikt is similar to the share-shift or Bartik instruments frequently
used in the literature in that it consists of two terms, an initial share (the use share)
and a shift term (subsidy exposure). In this case, the shift term is not a change, nor
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Figure 1·4: Changes in CEE subsidy share and WE imports of subsi-
dized intermediates, 2002-2012
Source: BEEPS, WIOT
are the left hand side variables in the first or second stages changes. The coefficient
β represents the impact in year t of subsidies received in years t− 1, t− 2, and t− 3
on Western European industries’ imports of intermediates. The interpretation of β
in equation 1.2 is that a one percent higher (or lower) level of foreign sourcing from
CEE countries is associated with a β percent higher (or lower) level of exposure to
CEE subsidies in the past three years.
Figure 1·3 shows a binned scatterplot of the first stage, controlling for all fixed
effects and controls in equation 1.2. There is a tight positive relationship between a
Western European industry’s subsidy exposure and the value of foreign sourcing of
intermediates from CEE countries.
Figure 1·4 shows the change from 2002 to 2012 in the share of firms receiving
subsidies in CEE countries and the change in Western European imports of subsidized
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Table 1.4: First stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(ForS) ln(ForS) ln(ForS) ln(ForS) ln(ForS)
ln(SubsidyExposure) 0.449∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.069) (0.069) (0.076) (0.073)
Country k FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No No No Yes No
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
F stat 26 16 16 32 14
Adj. R2 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.08
Observations 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
intermediates from that country and provides further intuition for the first stage.
The increase in Western European imports is higher for those CEE countries that
experienced larger increases in the share of firms receiving subsidies.
Results from first stage regressions are in Table 1.4. Column (1) contains no
fixed effects or control variables. Column (2) adds in country, industry and year
fixed effects. Column (3) adds in control variables. Columns (4) and (5) incorporate
twoway fixed effects with industry-year and country fixed effects in column (4) and
country-year and industry fixed effects in column (5). A Western European industry’s
foreign sourcing of intermediates from CEE countries is significantly and positively
associated with the industry’s exposure to CEE subsidies. First stage coefficients
range from 0.29 to 0.48, indicating that for the average Western European industry
a 10 percent increase in exposure to CEE subsidies is associated with a 2.9 to 4.8
percent increase in foreign sourcing from CEE countries. The F statistic is reported
for each first stage specification. Among the specifications with fixed effects, the
strongest first stage is the specification with industry-time and country fixed effects
in column (4).
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Figure 1·5: Reduced form
1.3.7 Reduced form
Greater subsidy exposure is associated with higher levels of foreign sourcing of inter-
mediate inputs. Because intermediate inputs are ingredients in domestic production,
greater foreign sourcing indicates higher levels of domestic production. Higher pro-
duction may or may not translate into greater domestic employment. Imports of inter-
mediates might compete with domestic intermediates or be labor-saving technologies
that ultimately reduce employment in the industry despite higher production.
The reduced form result provide evidence that greater subsidy exposure is asso-
ciated with higher levels of employment for an industry. Figure 1·5 shows a binned
scatterplot of the reduced form regression of employment in a Western European
industry on the industry’s subsidy exposure and industry, country and year fixed
effects and controls. There is a strong positive relationship between an industry’s
subsidy exposure and its employment. This relationship is confirmed by looking at
20
the reduced form results in Table 1.5 where coefficients are positive and significant,
showing industries in Western Europe with higher exposure to subsidies in Central
and Eastern Europe have greater levels of employment. For the average industry,
a 10 percent increase in subsidy exposure is associated with a 1.7 to 4.8 percent in
employment. The reduced form results for the total wage bill of a Western European
industry are similar to those of employment and are not presented here.
Table 1.5: Reduced form regressions of employment on subsidy expo-
sure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp)
ln(SubsidyExposure) 0.479∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040)
Country k FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No No No Yes No
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the country-industry level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.4 Results
Table 1.6: OLS: Impact of foreign sourcing on employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp)
ln(ForeignSourcing) 0.547∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040)
Country k FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No No No Yes No
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the country-industry level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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1.4.1 OLS estimation
I present OLS results on the impact of foreign sourcing on employment and wages
before moving on to 2SLS estimation. Equation 3.2 shows the OLS specification of
employment in industry i in Western European country k regressed on the industry
i’s foreign sourcing of intermediate inputs from the group of Central and Eastern
European countries. Results are in Table 1.6.
ln(Employmentikt) = α+βln(ForeignSourcingikt) +µk + ρi + δt + X
′B+ ikt (1.3)
Table 1.7: OLS: Impact of foreign sourcing on total wage bill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage)
ln(ForeignSourcing) 0.600∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Country k FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No No No Yes No
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the country-industry level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column (1) shows results for a specification with no controls or fixed effects. The
specifications in columns (2) and (3) have country, industry and year fixed effects.
Column (2) contains no controls, while column (3) includes the capital intensity of
an industry and the country’s unemployment rate as controls. The specifications in
columns (4) and (5) vary the fixed effects but keep the control variables. Column
(4) contains industry-year and country fixed effects. Column (5) has country-year
and industry fixed effects. All specifications have standard errors clustered at the
country-industry level. Aside from column (1), the specification without any fixed
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effects, the coefficient on foreign sourcing is consistently around 0.35 throughout all
specifications with fixed effects.
Results for the total wage bill in an industry are in Table 1.7. Similar to the em-
ployment results, the coefficient is positive and stable around 0.47 in all specifications
with fixed effects. Although the OLS coefficients suffer from concerns of endogene-
ity and bias, it is worthwhile to note that OLS finds the impact of an industry’s
foreign sourcing on its employment and total wage bill to be positive, a somewhat
surprising result given findings of worker displacement in developed countries from
import competition found in parts of the literature. Taken together, the OLS results
suggest an industry’s foreign sourcing from CEE countries positively impacts its level
of employment and the total wages it pays out to those employees, although the
OLS specifications might be picking up any number of endogenous factors, including
industry growth or demand shocks. The next section presents 2SLS results.
1.4.2 2SLS estimation
Table 1.8 presents results from 2SLS estimation regressing a Western European in-
dustry’s employment on its foreign sourcing from CEE countries instrumenting for
an industry’s foreign sourcing with its exposure to subsidies in CEE.
Similar to previous tables, column (1) in Table 1.8 shows results from a specifi-
cation with no fixed effects or controls. Column (2) adds industry, country and year
fixed effects but no controls. Columns (3)-(5) contain controls and varying fixed ef-
fects. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is reported as a measure of first stage strength.
The statistic ranges from 14 to 32, with the specification in column (4) containing
industry-year and country fixed effects having the strongest first stage.
The coefficient is positive and stable around 0.58 in all specifications with fixed
effects, confirming that higher levels of foreign sourcing of intermediates from CEE
countries are associated with higher levels of employment. Results imply that if an
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Table 1.8: 2SLS: Impact of foreign sourcing on employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp) ln(Emp)
ln(ForeignSourcing) 1.067∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.079) (0.078) (0.058) (0.082)
Country k FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No No No Yes No
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat 26 16 16 32 14
Observations 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the country-industry level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.9: 2SLS: Impact of foreign sourcing on wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage)
ln(ForeignSourcing) 0.957∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.098) (0.095) (0.079) (0.097)
Country k FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No No No Yes No
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat 26 16 16 32 14
Observations 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the country-industry level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
industry increases its foreign sourcing by 10 percent, it will experience an increase
in employment of 5.8 percent. For the industry in the sample with median foreign
sourcing of $44 million in 2002, a $4.4 million increase in foreign sourcing from CEE
countries results in a 5.8 percent increase in its 97,000 workers, or a gain of 5,600
workers.
Table 1.9 shows results from 2SLS estimation for the total wage bill in a Western
European industry. Coefficients in all specifications are positive and significant and
range from 0.64 to 0.70 in the specifications with fixed effects, indicating that a 10
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percent increase in foreign sourcing results in a 6.4 to 7.0 percent increase in the
total wage bill of a Western European industry. For the industry with median foreign
sourcing of $44 million in 2002, a 10 percent increase in foreign sourcing from CEE
adds to the total wage bill of $3.3 billion by $208 to $228 million. The changes in
employment and the total wage bill imply an increase in wages per worker of 0.4 to
1.0 percent, from approximately $33,600 to $33,700-$33,900.
Table 1.10: Changes in foreign sourcing-supported employment, by
Western European country, 2002-2012
Change
(thousands)
% change
% change
(total emp)
Austria 806 114% 10%
Belgium 745 206% 11%
Denmark 399 130% -1%
Finland 401 165% 4%
France 924 146% 8%
Germany 1,855 116% 8%
Ireland 273 233% 4%
Italy 919 132% 1%
Netherlands 648 160% 2%
Spain 423 110% 5%
Sweden 623 162% 7%
United Kingdom 873 143% 6%
1.4.3 Employment supported by foreign sourcing in Western European
countries
The results in the previous section provide evidence that Western European indus-
tries’ involvement in regional supply chains through foreign sourcing of intermediates
from CEE countries is linked to higher employment and wages per worker in the off-
shoring industry. In this section, I calculate the number of jobs supported by foreign
sourcing from CEE countries in each Western European country. I multiply the co-
efficient of 0.587 in column (3) of Table 1.8 by an industry’s foreign sourcing in 2002,
2005, 2009 and 2012 to determine how many jobs in a Western European industry
are supported by foreign sourcing then aggregate over industries in a country to get
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a total number of jobs per country. In this context, a job supported by foreign sourc-
ing is a job in an industry that sources from CEE countries, regardless of a worker’s
particular occupation or activities.
Column (1) in Table 1.10 shows the change in foreign-sourcing supported employ-
ment from 2002 to 2012. In all countries, the change is positive, indicating foreign
sourcing from CEE countries supported more employment in 2012 than in 2002.
Comparing the percent change in employment supported by foreign sourcing with
the percent change in foreign sourcing in Table 1.2 reveals some similar patterns.
Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, the countries that experienced the largest in-
creases in foreign sourcing from 2002 to 2012, have some of the biggest increases in
foreign-sourcing supported employment. Sweden and Finland also experience larger
than average gains in the percent change in employment supported by foreign sourc-
ing.
Table 1.11: Skill level of Occupations
Skill Level ISCO-08 Occupation
High 1. Managers
High 2. Professionals
High 3. Technicians and associate professionals
Medium 4. Clerical support workers
Medium 5. Service and sales workers
Medium 6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers
Medium 7. Craft and related trades workers
Medium 8. Plant and machine operators, and assemblers
Low 9. Elementary occupations
Source: EU Labor Force Survey
The third column of Table 1.10 gives the percent change in total employment in
the country from 2002 to 2012. Comparing the second and third columns reveals to-
tal employment increased much slower than employment supported by foreign sourc-
ing, indicating industries involved in regional supply chains have higher employment
growth than other industries. These results are evidence that even though regional
supply chains allow for the offshoring of intermediate inputs, employment in off-
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shoring industries is increasing at greater rates than employment in purely domestic
industries.
1.4.4 Impacts on high and low skill labor
Results in the previous section make clear that the number of jobs supported by
foreign sourcing increased from 2002 to 2012, reflecting higher employment growth in
industries participating in regional supply chains. In this section, I analyze whether
foreign sourcing impacts the skill level of jobs in the Western European industry.
Table 1.12: 2SLS: Impact of foreign sourcing on high skill employment
(1) (2) (3)
ln(HighSkillEmp) ln(HighSkillEmp) ln(HighSkillEmp)
ln(ForeignSourcing) 1.17 1.04∗∗ 1.61∗∗
(0.74) (0.44) (0.82)
Country k FE Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No Yes No
Observations 286 286 286
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the country-industry level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
I use data on industry employment by skill level from the EU Labor Force Survey
available from the International Labor Organization. The data provides industry em-
ployment numbers for three skill groups - low, medium and high skill workers. Table
1.11 shows the aggregate occupation groups classified as low, medium or high skill.
Employment by skill level is only available for six aggregated sectors: agriculture;
construction; manufacturing; mining and utilities; public administration, social and
other services; and trade, transport, accommodation, food and business administra-
tive services.
Using the data on employment by skill level, I re-estimate columns (3) through
(5) of Table 1.8. All specifications contain control variables and have standard errors
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clustered at the industry country level. The number of panel observations drops to
286 because of the aggregated sectors.
Table 1.12 presents results for high skill employment, varying the fixed effects
from column to column. In two of three specifications, foreign sourcing from Central
and Eastern Europe has a positive and significant effect on high skill employment in
Western European industries. In fact, a one percent increase in foreign sourcing is
associated with a greater than one percent increase in high skill employment.
Table 1.13: 2SLS: Impact of foreign sourcing on low skill employment
(1) (2) (3)
ln(LowSkillEmp) ln(LowSkillEmp) ln(LowSkillEmp)
ln(ForeignSourcing) -0.33 0.59 -0.69
(0.76) (0.49) (0.70)
Country k FE Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes No No
Country k x Year FE No No Yes
Industry x Year FE No Yes No
Observations 286 286 286
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the country-industry level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.14: 2SLS: Impact of foreign sourcing on high and low skill
employment
(1) (2) (3)
High Skill Ratio Low Skill Ratio High to Low Ratio
ln(ForeignSourcing) 0.32∗ -0.11∗ 11.06∗∗
(0.18) (0.06) (4.81)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Country k x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 286 286 286
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the country-industry level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Conversely, the same set of regressions using low skill employment on the left
hand side, seen in Table 1.13, show no significant impact of foreign sourcing on low
skill employment in Western European industries. These results are evidence that
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foreign sourcing supports jobs in high skill occupations and that higher employment
growth in those industries participating more in regional supply chains may be driven
by growth in high skill jobs. Results in Table 1.14 provide further evidence to this
point. Foreign sourcing is positively associated with the ratio of high skill to total
employment (column (1)), negatively associated with the ratio of low skill to total
employment (column (2)), and positively associated with the ratio of high to low skill
employment in an industry.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine whether sourcing of intermediate inputs from lower cost
countries is beneficial to employment, a phenomena the literature has named the pro-
ductivity effect. My empirical analysis of Western European industries that source
from Central and Eastern Europe makes use of data on subsidies received by firms
in the lower cost countries. I find that a Western European industry’s exposure to
subsidies is positively linked to its foreign sourcing from these regions and that in-
dustries with higher foreign sourcing have higher employment and wages per workers,
confirming that a productivity effect exists for industries that import intermediate
inputs. Results on the skill level of jobs in industries that source from CEE coun-
tries suggest higher employment is driven by high skill jobs, such as managers and
professional occupations.
My results provide evidence that participation in regional supply chains with
Central and Eastern European countries is beneficial to employment and wages in
Western European industries. Employment supported by foreign sourcing from CEE
countries increased the most in small countries such as Belgium, Ireland and the
Netherlands, suggesting these countries benefited the most from Central and Eastern
European countries’ entry into the European Union.
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Chapter 2
The effects of trade agreements on
imports of biologics: evidence from Chile
Danielle Trachtenberg, Warren A. Kaplan1, Veronika J. Wirtz2 and Kevin Gallagher3
2.1 Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPR) provisions have become a staple of modern free
trade agreements since the 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS), which set minimum standards for IPR protection for
World Trade Organization (WTO) members. TRIPS requires members to provide a
legal structure encompassing patents, trademarks, copyrights, other provisions such
as geographical indications and enforcement and dispute resolution.4 Because imple-
menting an IPR regime- including supporting robust patent protection- may reduce
the number of generic medicines available and increase the price of medicines, compli-
ance with the TRIPS requirements has been controversial in low and middle income
countries concerned about ensuring access to medicines, particularly those countries
with small domestic pharmaceutical industries or a large need for essential medicines
1Assistant Professor of Global Health, Boston University School of Public Health and Member
of the World Health Organization Collaborating Center on Pharmaceutical Policy
2Associate Professor of Global Health, Boston University School of Public Health and Director
of the World Health Organization Collaborating Center in Pharmaceutical Policy
3Professor of Global Development Policy, Pardee School of Global Studies and Director of the
Global Development Policy Center at Boston University
4The text of the TRIPS agreement is available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm
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(Smith, Correa and Oh, 2009).
Many recent bilateral or multilateral trade agreements increase the scope and
coverage of IPR provisions (so-called TRIPS-Plus agreements). More stringent IPR
provisions ensure profits and investments remain stable for pharmaceutical producers.
Additionally, pharmaceutical producers have greater incentives to undertake R&D
for new medicines (Barton (2004)). On the other hand, the potential for increased
market power of pharmaceutical producers has implications for prices and availability
of medicines, including generics (Correa, 2006).
The debate over the impact of trade agreements on access to medicines falls at
the intersection of trade, health and IPR policy.5 Now that TRIPS and TRIPS-
Plus agreements have been in place for a significant period, there is a considerable
literature in all three fields examining the impact of such provisions on access to
medicines, generally using price or consumption as an indicator of access. As we note
in our literature review, the empirical evidence on the impact of TRIPS and TRIPS-
Plus regimes on prices and consumption is mixed. Additionally, several limitations
exist that prevent analysts from making definitive conclusions.
This paper builds on the literature using a gravity model to estimate the impact
of the strength of the IPR provisions in Chile’s free trade agreements (FTAs) on the
value, volume and price of imported biologic medicines in Chile. We improve upon
the existing literature and address some of the limitations in previous analyses in
three ways. First, we develop new indicators for the strength of the IPR provisions in
Chile’s FTAs by classifying and coding the IPR provisions in Chile’s FTAs. Second,
we estimate the impact of IPR protection on biological medicines, which we argue
are important pharmaceuticals more likely to be impacted by IPR provisions in FTAs
than other medicines. Third, we estimate the impact of the strength of IPR provisions
5The interaction between trade, health and IPR policy is well-covered in two policy reports,
(WHO, WIPO and WTO (2012) and WHO (2015).
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on three dimensions of trade data-the nominal value of imports, the quantity imported
in kilograms and the unit value of imports-to better understand how imported biologic
medicines are affected.
We find that FTAs with stronger IPR provisions raise unit prices of imported
biologics into Chile. However, we also find that the imported volume of biologics
increases and the magnitude of the impact on volume is larger than that on unit
price. Further research is necessary to determine whether the increase in the volume
and unit prices of imports has led to greater universal access to biologics in Chile or
greater inequity in access of these medicines.
2.2 Literature review
There are two large sets of relevant literature, the effects of IPR protection on in-
ternational trade and the impact of trade agreements on access to medicines. The
literature examining the effect of the strength of patents or other intellectual property
rights on international trade includes cross-country studies (Maskus and Penubarti
(1995), Park and Lippoldt (2008)) and country-specific studies (Smith (1999), Co
(2004), Awokuse and Yin (2010), USITC (2011) and Koff et al. (2011)). The major-
ity of papers make use of gravity models to estimate the impact of IPR protection on
trade, finding that increased IPR protection is associated with larger nominal values
of imports.
Maskus and Penubarti (1995) frame the impact of IPR protection on international
trade as the sum of two competing effects, market expansion and market power. When
market expansion dominates, IPR protection increases international trade by reducing
the potential for infringement in importing markets. Conversely, market power can
decrease international trade when temporary monopolies to patent and other intel-
lectual property right holders result in increased prices and restricted quantities sold
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in importing markets. The examples in the empirical trade policy literature generally
find in favor of market expansion. Park and Lippoldt (2008) examine the impact of
IPR protection on trade and technology transfer, finding in favor of market expansion
in both value of imports and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows of high-tech prod-
ucts such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications equipment, which
they argue suggests import and investment flows contain technology that exporters
and investors want to protect.
Maskus and Penubarti (1995) note that the market power effect is more likely to
dominate in smaller countries without imitative capacity, i.e. countries that do not
have the resources and knowledge to innovate and produce domestically and therefore
rely on imports. The potential for reduced access to imported medicines is a major
concern for low and middle income countries, especially those that rely on imports
(Smith, Correa and Oh (2009)).
The second body of literature examines the potential for trade agreements to re-
duce the affordability and availability of medicines. Several ex-ante studies meant to
evaluate the impact of potential policy changes find large negative expected effects
from the implementation of TRIPS or TRIPS-Plus agreements. Akaleephan et al.
(2009) and Kessomboon et al. (2012) analyze the impact of the implementation of
TRIPS-Plus provisions in a proposed US-Thailand FTA, predicting a significant in-
crease in medicine prices in Thailand after implementation of the more stringent IPR
requirements in the FTA. IFARMA (2009) assesses the impact of IPR provisions in
the EU-Andean Community FTA in Peru, estimating that an increase in the number
of protected medicines would lead to price increases and declines in consumption.
Chauduri, Goldberg and Gia (2006) analyze the impact of the implementation of a
TRIPS-compliant patent regime in India and find a substantial consumer welfare loss
for Indian consumers of quinolones, even with price intervention tools available. Moir
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et al. (2014) assess the impact of the proposed patent provisions in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) on the cost of HIV medicines in Vietnam, finding the TPP will
reduce the number of eligible patients treated due to higher costs.
Ex-post empirical evidence is mixed. Several studies find harmful impacts from the
implementation of TRIPS or TRIPS-Plus FTAs. Abbott et al. (2012) and OXFAM
(2007) analyze the impact of the US-Jordan FTA, finding large price increases for
brand name medicines in Jordan. Shaffer and Brenner (2009) find the data exclusivity
provision in the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), a TRIPS-Plus
provision, limited availability for some lower cost generics in one member country,
Guatemala.
A number of studies, however, find neutral effects of IPR regimes on prices and
neutral or higher consumption and highlight the importance of pricing intervention
mechanisms designed to lessen the burden on low and middle income countries imple-
menting IPR regimes. Duggan et al. (2016) examine the implementation of a patent
system in India and find new patents caused only a small average price increase of 3 to
6 percent, did not decrease the number of firms making molecules and did not change
the quantity sold. The authors attribute their neutral findings to India’s ability to
implement price controls and patent licensing, which they note could influence pric-
ing decisions on the part of patent-holding firms. Results from Kyle and Qian (2014)
also suggest policies meant to counter expected medicine price increases are effective.
Kyle and Qian (2014) examine how patents affect new medicine launches, prices and
sales in 59 countries and find that patents are associated with earlier launch of a
product, higher sales but lower medicine prices, which they argue could be the result
of price control and licensing mechanisms.
In reviewing the literature on access to medicines, it is clear that there are several
challenges in undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the effects of trade agreements
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on price, consumption and other indicators of access to medicines, which might ex-
plain why results are mixed and few studies can be generalized to other environments.
Shadlen (2018) outlines the conceptual and methodological challenges, including the
choice of outcome variables, the context of negotiation and implementation of the
agreement and the framing of analytical questions. Shadlen notes that not all TRIPS-
Plus provisions are likely to affect the various domains of access; the provisions with
the highest potential to do so are related to patents, data exclusivity and limiting
the use of compulsory licensing. Similarly, not all medicines are equally likely to be
affected by IPR protections; new medicines are more likely to be affected by data
exclusivity and new patents, while older medicines might be affected by patent term
extension (Shadlen (2018)). Shadlen also notes the timing of the implementation of
the agreement or of the expiration of patents should be carefully considered when
constructing an analytical framework.
The analytical framework in our analysis addresses these concerns in three ways.
First, we develop new indicators of the strength of the IPR provisions in Chile’s FTAs
that allow us to focus on the effects of provisions most likely to affect availability
and affordability of medicines. Additionally, we can use our indicators to compare
which types of provisions have larger impacts on pharmaceutical imports. Second,
we focus on biological medicines or “biologics,” which we argue are more likely to
be impacted by IPR provisions in FTAs than other medicines. The manufacturing
of biologics is R&D intensive and done in countries with well-developed IPR and
innovation regimes that negotiate strong protections into trade agreements. Third,
we estimate the impact of the strength of IPR provisions on three dimensions of trade
data-the nominal value of imports, the quantity imported in kilograms and the unit
value of imports. Our use of three dimensions of trade data as outcome variables
goes beyond the usual focus on price and consumption, allowing us to dissect the
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impact on the value of imports into the components coming from changes in volume
and a proxy for price. Our approach also provides intuition on the impact of Chile’s
FTAs on the availability (imported volume) and affordability (unit price of imports)
of imported biologics, two key dimensions of the concept of access to medicines.6
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Trade data
We construct a dataset of Chile’s imports of pharmaceutical products by exporting
country and product for the years 1997 to 2016. Data on Chile’s imports of Harmo-
nized System (HS) 6 digit products comes from UN Comtrade.7 We focus on trade
in the HS-6 products falling under Chapter 30, i.e. Pharmaceutical Products of the
Harmonized System. Chapter 30 is divided into six subheadings-3001, 3002, 3003,
3004, 3005 and 3006-with approximately 30 HS-6 products classified under the six
subheadings.Chapter 30 products are divided into the following subheadings: 3001
Glands and other organs for organo-therapeutic uses, 3002 Human blood; animal
blood prepared for therapeutic, prophylactic or diagnostic uses; antisera and other
blood fractions and modified immunological products, 3003 Medicaments (excluding
goods of heading No. 3002, 3005 or 3006) consisting of two or more constituents which
have been mixed together for therapeutic or prophylactic uses, 3004 Medicaments (ex-
cluding goods of heading No. 30.02, 30.05 or 30.06) consisting of mixed or unmixed
products for therapeutic or prophylactic uses, 3005 Wadding, gauze, bandages and
similar articles (for example, dressings, adhesive plasters, poultices), impregnated or
coated with pharmaceutical substances or put up in forms or packings for retail sale
and 3006 Pharmaceutical goods specified in Note 4 to this Chapter. Although we fo-
6Management Sciences for Health. Chapter 1. Towards sustainable access to medicines. Washing-
ton, D.C.: MSH, 2012. Available at: http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s19577en/
s19577en.pdf
7https://comtrade.un.org
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cus on products in Chapter 30, it is possible relevant products exist in other chapters
of the Harmonized System, e.g. chemicals used in the manufacturing of medicines
that are classified under Chapter 28 (Inorganic Chemicals) or Chapter 29 (Organic
Chemicals).
Our econometric analysis uses data on the reported value (in dollars) and volume
(in kilograms) of imports and the unit value of imports. We calculate the unit value
as the value of imports of a HS-6 code divided by the number of kilograms imported
under the HS-6 code. We use the unit value as a proxy for the price of the HS-6
product; however, we note that the unit value may not accurately capture prices
of the potentially hundreds of individual pharmaceutical products imported under a
HS-6 code. The unit value also will not capture any markups or taxes within Chile.
Additionally, it is important to remember the mechanical relationship between the
unit value and the two components used in its calculation, the value and volume of
imports.
Additional data on bilateral tariffs and the distance between Chile and its trading
partners for our gravity dataset comes from the UNCTAD TRAINS database and the
CEPII gravity dataset, respectively.8
2.3.2 Creating measures of the strength of IPR protection
We review the language used in the IPR provisions in each FTA and categorize each
provision as TRIPS-Plus, TRIPS neutral or not explicitly mentioned in the treaty’s
IPR chapter, according to the literature on the commonly accepted definition of
TRIPS-Plus provisions.9 We accessed the text of all of Chile’s bilateral and multilat-
eral FTAs in force from the Foreign Trade Information System of the Organization
8TRAINS tariff data accessed via WITS (https://wits.worldbank.org). CEPII gravity
database available at http://www.cepii.fr/
9See Mercurio (2006), El Said (2010) and Clift (2007).
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of American States.10 Agreements only available in Spanish (Panama, Peru, Colom-
bia and Vietnam) were not translated. We used the analytical framework found in
Roffe (2004) to divide the IPR provisions into the following domains: objectives,
temporal scope of application and general principles, including minimum standards,
non-derogation clause, national treatment, most favored nation, substantive IP provi-
sions, e.g., patentable subject matter and exceptions, regulatory exemptions, patent
revocation, delays in patent granting, protection of “undisclosed information.”
We then categorized all provisions relating to IPR in Chile’s trade agreements
as falling into one or more of these above-referenced domains, noting when no such
‘domain’ language existed in an agreement. We did not review enforcement and
dispute settlement provisions in any of these agreements, nor did we review authors’
copyright and related rights (i.e., rights of a creative work not connected with the
work’s actual author).
Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3 shows the eleven provisions and our assessment of
whether the language in each provision indicates the provision is TRIPS-Plus (TP),
TRIPS compliant (C) or there is no specific language relevant to the provision in
the FTA (N). In some cases, it is not clear whether a provision is fully suggestive of
TRIPS-Plus policies. We classify these provisions as potentially TRIPS-Plus (TP*),
but treat them equivalent to regular TRIPS-Plus provisions in our analysis.
From Tables A.2 and A.3, we construct three measures of the strength of the
IPR provisions in a treaty. TRIPSPlus is a dummy variable indicating whether the
FTA contains any provisions considered to be TRIPS Plus. The TRIPSPlus variable
is equal to one only for the United States, Australia and the four EFTA countries,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. IPRScore scores the IPR chapter of
each FTA by assigning each of the eleven provisions in Tables A.2 and A.3 a score
(0 if there is no specific language in the FTA for that provision, 1 if the language if
10http://www.sice.oas.org
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TRIPS compliant or TRIPS neutral and 2 if the language indicates the provision is
TRIPS Plus) and summing up over all provisions to calculate IPRScore. IPRScore
ranges from 1-15 for Chile’s FTA partners. PatentScore scores the FTA on four of the
eleven provisions, those four provisions related to patents, by assigning a score of 1
to each provision if it is mentioned in the FTA and summing over all four provisions.
The PatentScore variable takes values of 0 to 4. For Panama, Peru, Colombia and
Vietnam, the four countries whose FTAs with Chile were not available in English,
we assigned values of TRIPSPlus, IPRScore and PatentScore from the most similar
country among Chile’s FTA partners (Mexico for Panama, Peru and Colombia and
Thailand for Vietnam).
TRIPSPlus, IPRScore and PatentScore are measures of the strength of the IPR
provisions in each of Chile’s FTAs. We use these measures to estimate whether
treaties with stronger IPR provisions result in larger impacts on unit value, volume
and value of imported biologic medicines.
2.3.3 Identifying pharmaceutical products impacted by IPR provisions
As noted in Shadlen (2018), not all medicines are equally impacted by IPR provisions
in FTAs. We believe the IPR provisions in Chile’s FTAs are more likely to impact
biological medicines than other medicines. Biological medicines are those that are pro-
duced through a biotechnological process and are made using a variety of genetically
engineered source materials from human, animal, and microorganism. They act in
the body by replicating natural substances such as enzymes, antibodies, or hormones
in contrast to “small molecule” medicines whose structures are well characterized and
made using relatively well-developed organic chemical methods.11 Examples of bio-
logical medicines are vaccines, insulin and monoclonal antibodies used to treat cancer
11Food and Drug Administration. Available at: https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
ConsumerUpdates/ucm048341.htm [accessed June 30 2018]
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or rheumatoid arthritis.
The manufacturing of biologics is more complex than that of small molecules
with many technological advances made in the last 20 years, making the use of
IPR provisions especially relevant to protect the technology and research embed-
ded in these medicines.12 Manufacturing and marketing of biologics is currently
dominated by pharmaceutical companies from countries in Europe and North Amer-
ica with well-developed IPR legislation and powerful lobbies for strong IPR provi-
sions in trade agreements. The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement
that included the U.S. contained several provisions related to biologics. During the
TPP negotiations, U.S. pharmaceutical companies lobbied for protection of biological
medicines and the clinical data used in their development while other TPP countries
felt such strong provisions protection would reduce availability and affordability of
new medicines (Branstetter, 2016).
In our analysis, we focus on the impact of Chile’s FTAs on imported biological
medicines. Appendix Table A.1 lists the HS-6 codes in Chapter 30 of the Harmonized
Schedule we classify as biological medicines. We did not have access to a detailed
tariff schedule for Chilean imports, so we examined the more detailed HTS-10 codes
in the 2016 U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule to construct our classification.13 We
used descriptions of the HTS-10 codes classified under a HS-6 code in the U.S. as an
indication of the types of medicines imported under each HS-6 code in Chile to label
the HS-6 code as a biological medicine or not.14
12http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/Research
13The 2016 U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule is available at https://hts.usitc.gov
14Because the most disaggregated level at which tariff schedules are harmonized internationally is
the HS-6 level of aggregation, the composition of the HTS-10 products comprising a HS-6 code may
be different for the U.S. and Chile and our examination of U.S. HTS-10 codes may not be an exact
representation of what is imported at a disaggregated level in Chile. The econometric analysis in
this paper is at the more aggregated HS-6 level at which product categories are harmonized inter-
nationally and should not be greatly affected by our examination of U.S. HTS-10 codes conducted
to classify the contents of a HS-6 code.
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Figure 2·1: Chilean pharmaceutical imports (million $), 1997 to 2016
Source: UN Comtrade
2.3.4 Data analysis
Figure 2·1 shows the value of Chapter 30 pharmaceutical imports (blue line) and the
share of pharmaceutical imports in Chile’s total imports (red line) from 1997 to 2016.
Imports of Chapter 30 pharmaceutical products increase nearly five times over this
period, from $170 million in 1997 to $920 million in 2016, greatly outpacing the 66
percent growth in GDP per capita from $9,000 to $15,000 over the same period. The
share of pharmaceutical products in Chile’s total imports increased in the late 1990s
to 1.6 percent and dropped down to 0.6 percent in the mid-2000s before rising again
to a total of 1.6 percent of total imports in 2016.
The steady rise in the value of Chile’s imports of pharmaceutical products could be
related to the increase in the number of FTAs Chile signed in the late 1990s and 2000s.
Although Chile negotiated a handful of preferential trade agreement in the early
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Figure 2·2: Biologic and non-biologic imports, 1997 to 2016
Source: UN Comtrade
1990s with Bolivia, Venezuela and Argentina, the majority of its trade agreements
came into force in the late 1990s and 2000s, including MERCOSUR (1996), Canada
(1997), Mexico (1999), EU (2003), USA (2004), South Korea (2004), China (2006),
Japan (2007), India (2007) and Australia (2009).15
In Figures 2·2 through 2·4, we divide pharmaceutical imports into imports of
biologic and non-biologic medicines. Figure 2·2 shows the change since 1997 in the
value of Chilean imports of biologics (red line) and non-biologics (blue line). Although
imports of biologics are smaller in value in 1997 (2016),-imports of biologics were $20
million ($274 million) compared to $166 million ($907 million) for non-biologics,-the
value of imports of biologics increased at a higher rate relative to its 1997 value than
that of non-biologics. Figure 2·2 shows an increase in the value of biologic imports
of over 1000 percent from its 1997 value while imports of non-biological medicines
15http://www.sice.oas.org
42
Figure 2·3: Volume of imports of biologics and non-biologics, 1997 to
2016
Source: UN Comtrade
increased by less than 500 percent.
Although import volumes of both biologics and non-biologics vary from year to
year, absolute volumes of imported biologics remain substantially below those of
non-biologics throughout the period. In 1997, Chile imported 275,000 kilograms of
biologics compared to 8.6 million kilograms of non-biologics. Biologics, however,
were imported at much higher unit values than non-biologics, an average of $162 per
kilogram over the period 1997-2016 compared to $40 per kilogram.
Figures 2·3 and 2.2 show the changes from 1997 in the volume and unit value of
imported biologics (red line) and non-biologic medicines (blue line). Despite being
imported in a lower volume, Figure 2·3 shows biologic imports increased well above
their 1997 volume for most of the period, while the change in volume of non-biologics
has been effectively negative since 1997. The percent change in the average unit
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Figure 2·4: Unit value of imports of biologics and non-biologics, 1997
to 2016
Source: UN Comtrade
values of imported biologics and non-biologics since 1997 trended together for most
of the period, seen in Figure 2·4. After 2012, however, changes in the average unit
value of biologics and non-biologics diverged, with unit prices increasing for biologics,
medicines with already higher unit values, and declining for non-biologics relative to
1997.
Figures 2·3 and 2·4 show that the steep annual increase in the value of biologic
imports relative to their 1997 values (as seen in Figure 2·2 after 2005) is due to a
more moderate increase in volume and large increase in import unit value over the
last 20 years. In contrast, the volume of imported non-biologics has declined since
1997 and the import unit value is on a downward trend in recent years. Even though
biologics are a small share of pharmaceutical imports, the volume and unit value of
imports of these IP-sensitive products is increasing.
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2.4 Econometric analysis
Our econometric analysis examines whether the strength of the IPR provisions in
Chile’s FTAs can account for the trends in the value, volume and unit value of imports
seen in Figures 2·2 through 2·4. Our analysis focuses on imports of biologics, the group
of medicines we believe is most affected by IPR provisions in trade agreements.
We use a gravity model to estimate the impact of FTAs containing strong IPR
provisions on biologic imports, controlling for other factors potentially driving phar-
maceutical imports in Chile, seen in equation 2.1. We use a standard gravity speci-
fication with the natural log of the volume of a HS-6 product imported in kilograms
from exporting country n in year t as the dependent variable. Our independent vari-
ables include IPR, which is one of the three calculated measures described above
(TRIPSP lus, IPRScore, PatentScore) representing the strength of the IPR provi-
sions in a treaty, and Biologic, a dummy variable for the HS-6 codes we classify as
biologics. The three IPR measures vary by partner country n and year t (before the
entry into force of an FTA, all IPR measures are 0).
We interact each IPR measure with the Biologic dummy to estimate the impact
of strong IPR provisions in a treaty on the volume of imports of biologics. FTA
is a dummy variable equal to one in the years following the entry into force of an
FTA between Chile and exporting country n. We also include an interaction term
between FTA and Biologic to capture the effect of the FTA on the imported volume
of biologics. Our gravity dataset covers all imported HS-6 codes in Chapter 30 from
1997 to 2015 in Chile.
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ln(KGn,HS6,t) = β0 + β1IPRnt + β2BiologicHS6+
β3IPRnt ∗BiologicHS6 + β4FTAnt + β5FTAnt ∗BiologicHS6+
β6TariffHS6,t + β7Distancen + n,HS6,t
(2.1)
Exporter, year and HS-6 product fixed effects are included to control for any
unobserved and omitted trends specific to an exporter, year or product that may be
influencing the volume of Chile’s imports. We also include as control variables the
applied bilateral tariff on the HS-6 product and the natural log of the distance between
the exporting country and Chile as proxies for trade costs. We repeat our regressions
with two additional dependent variables, the unit value of imports of an HS-6 code
and the value of imports in dollars. Our coefficient of interest in all regressions is β3,
which gives the effect of treaties with strong IPR provisions on imports of biologics.
If the market expansion effect of Maskus and Penubarti (1995) dominates and
strong IPR treaties are associated with a higher volume imported, we expect β3 to
be positive for specifications with volume as the dependent variable. On the other
hand, if the market power effect dominates, we expect higher unit values of imported
biologics (β3 > 0 for specifications with unit value as the dependent variable) and
smaller volumes of imported biologics (β3 < 0 for specifications estimating the impact
on volume). The effect of strong IPR provisions on the value of imports under either
effect is ambiguous a priori.
Table 2.1 presents the results from regressions of the volume of imports in kilo-
grams on our three IPR measures, the dummy variable for biologics and interaction
and control terms. Column (1) uses PatentScore as our measure of treaty IPR
strength, column (2) uses IPRScore and column (3) uses TRIPSP lus. Our coef-
ficient of interest appears in all columns as the interaction term between Biologic
and each measure of treaty IPR strength. In each case, it is positive and significant.
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Treaties with stronger IPR provisions are associated with larger volumes of imported
biologics.
The coefficient of 0.18 on the interaction between Biologic and PatentScore in
column (1) implies that a one unit increase in PatentScore, which is equivalent to
adding one patent-related provision to the IPR chapter of an FTA, results in an
approximately 20 percent (100 ∗ (e0.18− 1)) increase in the imported volume of bio-
logics in Chile. The coefficient of 0.10 on the interaction term between Biologic and
IPRScore in column (2) implies that a one unit increase in IPRScore, equivalent
to adding an IPR provision with TRIPS-neutral or TRIPS-compliant language to an
FTA, results in an 11 percent increase in imported volume of biologics. Adding a
provision with TRIPS-Plus language to an FTA is a two unit increase in IPRScore
and results in a 22 percent increase in the imported volume of biologics. The coeffi-
cient of 0.79 on interaction between Biologic and TRIPSP lus is presented in column
(3). Having any TRIPS-Plus provisions in an FTA, i.e. TRIPSP lus equal to one,
increases imported volume of biologics by 120 percent relative to an FTA with no
TRIPS-Plus provisions. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term between
the FTA and Biologic dummy variables is negative, indicating the mere presence of
an FTA is not sufficient to increase the volume of biologic imports. The content of the
IPR chapter in the FTA does matter for imports of biologics, as seen by the impacts
of various measures of IPR strength on the volume of imported biologics discussed
above. The difference between the impact of FTAs on imported biologics and other
medicines is further highlighted by the positive and significant coefficient on the FTA
dummy variable. FTAs increase the imported volume of all pharmaceutical imports
when we do not distinguish between biologics and non-biologics, but the imported
volume of biologics is larger only under FTAs with strong IPR provisions. The nega-
tive coefficient on the biologic dummy reflects the fact that the imported volume and
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Table 2.1: The effect of IPR treaty strength on volume of imports
(1) PatentScore (2) IPRScore (3) TRIPSPlus
ln(KG) ln(KG) ln(KG)
Biologic -4.06∗∗∗ -4.04∗∗∗ -4.01∗∗∗
(1.18) (1.18) (1.18)
PatentScore 0.09
(0.07)
Biologic*PatentScore 0.18∗
(0.09)
IPRScore -0.01
(0.02)
Biologic*IPRScore 0.10∗∗∗
(0.03)
TRIPSPlus -0.25
(0.20)
Biologic*TRIPSPlus 0.79∗∗∗
(0.29)
FTA 0.28∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.12)
Biologic*FTA -0.30∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -0.32∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.18)
ln(Distance) -0.88 -0.86 -0.84
(3.91) (3.90) (3.91)
Tariff -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
HS6 FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6727 6727 6727
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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value of biologics is lower than non-biologic medicines in Chapter 30.
Table 2.2 presents results using the unit value of imports, a proxy for prices, as
the dependent variable. As in Table 2.1, our coefficient of interest on the interaction
between Biologic and one of our three measures of IPR strength is positive and
significant, suggesting prices of biologics increase when imported under FTAs with
strong IPR provisions. The coefficient of 0.14 in column (1) suggests that adding
one patent-related provision to an FTA increases prices by approximately 15 percent.
Results in column (2) show that adding any IPR provision with TRIPS compliant
language increases prices by 4 percent (or 8 percent for adding one provision with
TRIPS Plus language to an FTA). The coefficient of 0.52 in column (3) implies an
FTA with any TRIPS-Plus language increases prices of biologics by 68 percent relative
to an FTA with no TRIPS-Plus language.
Again, the coefficient on the interaction between Biologic and FTA is negative,
demonstrating the mere presence of an FTA is not sufficient to impact unit values of
imported biologics. What matters for biologics is the strength of the IPR language in
an FTA. This is not the case for non-biologic medicines; the negative coefficients
on the FTA dummy indicate that the presence of an FTA lowers unit values of
all imported pharmaceutical products, again highlighting the difference between the
impact on biologics and non-biologics from an FTA.
Table 2.3 presents results for regressions of the value of imports on our key inde-
pendent variables and controls. It is no surprise that our coefficients of interest on
the interaction between Biologic and the three measures of IPR strength are positive,
as we know from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 that the volume and price of imported biolog-
ics increase when biologics are imported under FTAs with strong IPR provisions.
Adding a patent provision to an FTA increases the value of imports of biologics by
approximately 38 percent. Adding any IPR provision with TRIPS compliant language
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Table 2.2: The effect of IPR treaty strength on unit value of imports
(1) PatentScore (2) IPRScore (3) TRIPSPlus
ln(ValKG) ln(ValKG) ln(ValKG)
Biologic -1.05∗∗ -1.06∗∗ -1.07∗∗
(0.51) (0.51) (0.51)
PatentScore -0.05∗
(0.03)
Biologic*PatentScore 0.14∗∗∗
(0.04)
IPRScore -0.01
(0.01)
Biologic*IPRScore 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01)
TRIPSPlus -0.04
(0.09)
Biologic*TRIPSPlus 0.52∗∗∗
(0.12)
FTA -0.11∗∗ -0.09 -0.13∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Biologic*FTA 0.05 -0.07 0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
ln(Distance) 0.31 0.31 0.30
(1.69) (1.69) (1.69)
Tariff 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
HS6 FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6727 6727 6727
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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increases the value of imports of biologics by 15 percent, implying that adding one
provision with TRIPS-Plus language to an FTA increases the value of imports by 30
percent. The value of imports of biologics is 271 percent higher for FTAs containing
any TRIPS-Plus language relative to FTAs with no TRIPS-Plus language.
2.5 Conclusions and future research
We examined the impact of the strength of the IPR provisions using new indicators we
developed from the text of Chile’s FTAs. We find the strength of the IPR provisions
in an FTA matters for the imported volume and unit value of imports of biologics
and, by extension, the total value of imports of these products. FTAs with strong IPR
provisions increase both the volume and unit value of imported biologics, indicating
both the market expansion and market power effects are present. Comparing the
magnitude of our results in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows that the quantity imported in
kilograms is more affected by all three measures of treaty IPR strength than the unit
value of imports, our proxy for price, suggesting the market expansion effect may be
larger.
Comparing the impacts of the three measure of IPR strength on all three measures
of imports (value, volume and unit value), the largest impact on imports comes from
implementing an FTA with at least one TRIPS-Plus provision. This result is intuitive,
as FTAs with deeper integration have the potential to significantly stimulate bilateral
trade by removing non-pecuniary barriers to trading IP-intensive goods in addition
to pecuniary barriers. By comparing the impacts of PatentScore and IPRScore, we
see that the impacts on imports of adding a patent-related provision to an FTA are
consistently larger than for any other type of IPR provision. In the case of Chile,
patents, therefore, are important drivers of imports of IP-intensive biologics.
Our paper contributes to the literature by developing new indicators of treaty
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Table 2.3: The effect of IPR treaty strength on value of imports
(1) PatentScore (2) IPRScore (3) TRIPSPlus
ln(Imports) ln(Imports) ln(Imports)
Biologic -5.11∗∗∗ -5.09∗∗∗ -5.08∗∗∗
(1.09) (1.09) (1.09)
PatentScore 0.04
(0.06)
Biologic*PatentScore 0.32∗∗∗
(0.09)
IPRScore -0.02
(0.02)
Biologic*IPRScore 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02)
TRIPSPlus -0.29
(0.19)
Biologic*TRIPSPlus 1.31∗∗∗
(0.27)
FTA 0.17 0.25∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Biologic*FTA -0.25 -0.64∗∗∗ -0.30∗
(0.16) (0.18) (0.16)
ln(Distance) -0.57 -0.55 -0.54
(3.61) (3.60) (3.61)
Tariff -0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
HS6 FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6727 6727 6727
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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IPR strength, focusing on one group of pharmaceuticals that is highly affected by
IPR provisions and increasingly important to public health and using the gravity
model to estimate the impacts on the value, volume and unit value of imports. Our
work, however, has an important limitation. Our results suggest that IPR-intensive
FTAs may raise the unit value and volume of imported biologics, but our work cannot
answer whether Chile’s FTAs have expanded or limited universal access to medicines
in general and biologics in particular. Optimistically, increased imports could have
led to more access to biologics across the Chilean population. However, increased
imports could be due to losses in domestic production or diversion of government
purchases away from spending on other health or necessary investments. Even if
Chile’s IPR-intensive FTAs result in trade creation related to biologics, it is possible
additional imports are distributed upwards toward those patients that can afford the
higher prices, increasing inequity in access (Wirtz et al, 2017). It is beyond the scope
of this paper to conduct a corollary analysis on domestic factors affecting Chile’s
imports and the distributional aspects related to pharmaceuticals. On its own, this
paper adds to the literature and debate over the effect of trade agreements on the
imports of medicines. Moreover, our findings raise interesting questions and provide
new avenues for further research.
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Chapter 3
Occupation Content of Imports: Do
States Import More Content From
Declining Occupations?
3.1 Introduction
It is an often noted fact that trade declined during the Great Recession. Weak import
demand worldwide and higher barriers to trade financing in some countries caused a
drastic, but short-lived fall in trade in 2009. The Great Trade Collapse of 2008-2009
is well-documented in the literature; see Bems, Johnson and Yi (2012) and Baldwin
(2009) for surveys. Global trade rebounded the next year and increased in subsequent
years. In the United States, imports declined by 26 percent from an all time high
in 2008 to 2009 but by 2011 had already exceeded the 2008 value. U.S. exports
followed a similar pattern. Figure 3·1 shows the rebound in imports at the state level
from 2009 to 2013.1 Total personal consumption expenditures (PCE) in the U.S. also
followed a similar pattern as aggregate imports, declining in 2009 but quickly rising
to surpass pre-recession levels.2
Although global trade bounced back quickly after its drastic drop in 2009 and
aggregate consumption also returned quickly to pre-recession levels, employment did
not follow the same pattern. While Figure 3·1 shows the clear recovery of imports,
Figure 3·2 reveals a different pattern for employment over the same period. Figure
1Data on U.S. imports for consumption and domestic exports taken from USITC Dataweb.
2Data on PCE from the BEA U.S. National Accounts.
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Figure 3·1: State imports, 2009 and 2013
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3·2 plots the percent change since 2007 of employment in six aggregate groups of
occupations. Three occupation groups generally increased over the period with only
minor, if any, declines during the recession. The three occupation groups that expe-
rienced an increase are management and financial occupations, professional services
occupations and other services occupations, which includes occupations in healthcare
support, personal care, food preparation and service, building and grounds cleaning,
and protective service. The other three groups of occupations - jobs in construction,
production and sales - saw employment decline steeply during the 2009 recession and
had not recovered to pre-recession levels by 2013.
Figure 3·2: Changes in employment by occupation group, 2007-2013
Figure 3·2 illustrates the polarization of jobs in the U.S. economy, the contempo-
raneous growth of jobs in high and low skill services and decline of manufacturing
jobs, a phenomenon discussed in detail in Autor and Dorn (2013), Autor, Levy and
Murnane (2003) and Jaimovich and Siu (2012), among others. From Figure 3·2, it
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is clear that the employment shares of different occupation groups shifted during the
2009 recession. Employment in low and high skill services increased at the expense
of production, construction and sales jobs.
The literature on polarization of employment in the United States primarily has
linked the phenomenon to technological change that lowered the cost of automating
routine tasks. Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and Autor and Dorn (2013) show
that adoption of computers led to a decline in employment in jobs intensive in routine
tasks. Because computers and other automated technologies do not directly substitute
for low skill (e.g. janitors) or high skill (e.g. scientists) service workers, the falling cost
of automation primarily impacted middle skill jobs whose tasks were easily codifiable
(e.g. bookkeepers, production workers). Middle skill workers, particularly those in
production-oriented jobs, also are more likely to be involved in the production of
goods that could be substituted for imports. For example, a worker involved in the
production of ball bearings is more susceptible to import competition than workers
in low or high skill service sectors.
Jaimovich and Siu (2012) document the decline in middle-skill employment during
recessions. The authors show that the vast majority of job losses of middle skill jobs
occur during recessions and that employment in these occupations does not rebound
after recessions starting in the 1990s.
Is there a relationship between polarization of employment in the U.S. during re-
cessions and the types of products imported after the recession? In other words, after
recessions, do imports contain more content from occupations lost during recessions?
In this paper, I relate the changes in the structure of employment during the Great
Recession to the content of products imported after the recession. I construct a mea-
sure of the value of imports that can be attributed to an occupation, which I call the
occupation content of imports. I then empirically examine whether the occupation
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content of imports is driven by changes in an occupation’s share of a state’s employ-
ment during the recession. I find evidence that changes in these two measures might
be related, but no causal evidence to suggest that employment changes in the U.S.
are causing changes in the content of U.S. imports.
3.2 Related literature
In addition to the literature on polarization mentioned above, this paper is linked to
the empirical trade literature on trade and employment. Most relevant to this paper
are Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) and Pierce and Schott (2016). Autor, Dorn and
Hanson (2013) analyze the relative effects of trade shocks versus technology shocks
(in their paper, an increase in imports from China versus an increase in automation)
on local labor markets. They find separate and distinct effects for trade and tech-
nology shocks; increases in imports from China in a commuting zone in the U.S. are
associated with declines in manufacturing employment and increases in unemploy-
ment in that zone, while increases in automation in the zone have a largely neutral
effect on total employment but result in larger polarization of the composition of
occupations within affected sectors. Pierce and Schott (2016) similarly link declines
in local manufacturing employment to increases in imports from China, noting that
manufacturing jobs do not return to affected areas after a recession possibly because
the recession serves as a catalyst to update production processes, and shed excess
labor.
While these papers are concerned with the effects of increased imports on local
labor markets, it is possible that causality between import demand and local labor
conditions also runs the opposite way. This paper is notably different from the ex-
isting literature in that I aim to explain changes in the content of imports resulting
from changes in employment, rather than estimate the impact on employment due to
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imports.
To estimate the impact on the content of imports, I link trade and labor markets
data to construct a measure of the value of imports that can be attributed to a
particular occupation. Several papers in the literature construct related measures
linking trade flows to labor market information. The factor content of trade method
provides an estimate of the amount of each factor of production embodied in export
flows for Heckscher-Olin multi-factor models (see Helpman (1984)). Lanz, Miradout
and Nordas (2011) construct a database of the task content of trade in goods and
services, building on the idea of trade in tasks developed in Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008). Most recently, the global supply chain literature has decomposed
global gross trade flows into trade in value added flows. Value added flows provide
the amount of the gross trade flow that is value added in a particular country.3 Each
of these methods looks at trade flows as more than just the dollar value of goods and
services crossing borders and uses the trade flow to characterize types of labor, tasks
or processes performed in origin, destination and production countries.
3.3 Data sources
This paper makes use of data from two main sources. I aggregate individual level
data from the American Community Survey (ACS) to construct employment by occu-
pation, industry and U.S. state. Occupations in the ACS are based on the Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) and industries are reported in ACS industry codes,
roughly equivalent to NAICS 4 digit codes. Data on state imports by industry comes
from the U.S. Census Bureau, reported in NAICS 4 digit codes.
I combine the aggregated ACS data with the industry-level data on state imports
by creating a mapping between the ACS industries and NAICS 4 digit codes, then
3For examples of value added trade flows, see the OECD TiVA or EORA MRIO databases.
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merging the ACS data with the import values at the ACS industry and state level. The
merged ACS-Census dataset includes 71 industries, meaning there are 71 industries
in which there is both domestic production and imports for the years used in this
analysis, 2007-2013. These 71 industries employ 526 different occupations.
The final dataset used in my empirical analysis is a cross-section of occupations by
state. I create two variables at the occupation-state level, the share of an occupation’s
employment in a state and a measure of the occupation content of state imports. In
order to create a variable measuring the occupation content of imports, data on the
number of workers by occupation and industry are used to break each industry import
value into the value of imports that can be attributed to a particular occupation based
on whether that occupation is employed in the industry in the United States. The
next section contains a more detailed description on the construction of the occupation
content of imports. Data from the ACS on the number of workers in an occupation
and industry also are used to construct the main independent variable, the change
in the share of employment of a particular occupation in a state and its instrument,
discussed below.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Occupation content of imports
To analyze the impact of changes in employment on the content of imports, I construct
a measure of the occupation content of imports. For occupation j employed by indus-
tries k in state s during year t, OccImpsjt measures the value of state imports that can
be attributed to an occupation. To construct OccImpsjt, state imports by industry
(ImportV alueskt) are disaggregated to an occupation-industry-state value using each
occupation’s share of industry employment in the state as a weight (OccWeightsjkt).
The disaggregated import values are then aggregated over all industries k. The re-
60
sulting occupation content of imports, OccImpsjt, is a measure of the dollar value of
imports of state s that can be attributed to occupation j for all industries k employing
the occupation in the state.
OccImpsjt =
∑
k
(OccWeightsjkt ∗ ImportV alueskt) (3.1)
where
OccWeightsjkt =
1
S − 1
∑
s∈S′
(
Empsjk,2005∑
j
∑
k Empsjk,2005
)
OccWeightsjkt is constructed from data in 2005, prior to the 2007-2013 period in
this analysis to avoid concerns of endogeneity between the employment weight used
in construction of OccImp on the left hand side and employment values on the right
hand side. To further avoid complications from endogeneity, OccWeightsjkt for state
s is calculated as the average employment share of all states that are not state s
where the groups of states that do not include state s is referred to as S ′.
Table 3.1: Occupation Content of Imports (billion $), by occupation
group
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Management and financial 479 297 377 424 378 428
Professional 343 258 275 299 311 310
Services 37 16 20 33 32 21
Sales and office 419 272 311 376 419 398
Construction and nat. resources 274 177 233 267 273 241
Production 851 596 689 786 834 834
Table 3.1 presents values of OccImp for 2008 to 2013 for the aggregate occupation
groups seen in Table 3.3 and aggregated over all over states. For example, the value
of 851 for production occupations in 2008 means that United States imports in 2008
contained $851 billion of content related to production occupations. In other words,
the United States imported $851 billion of products where production workers would
have been involved in the making of the imported products if the were made in the
United States.
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Since the occupation content of imports is constructed using merchandise goods
trade data, the occupation groups involved in the making of physical goods (i.e.
production occupations) will have the largest values of OccImp by construction. Oc-
cupations in the low and high skill services occupations contained in the Services
occupation group will have the lowest amount of imports attributed to them because
services trade data is not used in the construction of OccImp.
All occupation groups experience a decline in their content in imports in 2009
during the recession and a slow recovery in the years following the recession. Imported
content of production occupations, for example, declined from $851 billion in 2008 to
$596 in 2009 and had recovered to near its 2008 peak by 2012. Imported content from
management and financial occupations, sales and office occupations and production
occupations experienced the largest recoveries of over 40 percent from 2009 to 2013.
For the 500+ occupations comprising the six occupation groups in Table 3.1, I analyze
whether the recovery in the occupation content of state imports is related to changes
in an occupation’s share of employment in a state.
3.4.2 Cross sectional analysis
I use variation in changes in the occupation content of imports across states and oc-
cupation to analyze whether changes in a state’s pattern of employment is associated
with changes in the state’s imported occupation content. Equation 3.2 presents an
ordinary least squares (OLS) specification regressing the post-recession change in the
occupation content of imports of occupation j in state s on the recession-era change
in occupation j’s share of employment in state s. I regress the change in occupa-
tion content from 2009 to 2013 on the change in the share of employment from 2007
to 2009. The years used to construct the change variables were chosen to capture
the drop in employment during the recession and the rebound in imports after the
recession. All changes are in changes in the natural log of the variables.
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∆ln(OccImpsj,2009−13) = α + β∆ln(OccSharesj,2007−09) + sj (3.2)
where
OccSharesjt =
Empsjt∑
j Empsjt
Given the differential trends in employment of different occupations groups seen in
Figure 3·2, what is the expected direction of the impact of employment changes on the
occupation content of imports? I propose that the relationship between employment
changes and the occupation content of imports is negative. For occupations that see
their share of employment decline in a state during the recession, state imports should
see imported content from that occupation increase. Conversely, occupations on the
rise in a state should experience a decline in the occupation content of imports.
This hypothesis provides an explanation for the patterns seen in Figures 3·1 and
3·2, specifically why imports rebounded quickly after the recession but polarization
of employment deepened. Furthermore, this hypothesis fits with the finding in the
empirical trade and employment literature that in some cases imports are a substitute
for domestic employment. In this paper, I test if the direction of causality runs the
opposite way than the established literature, i.e. do changes in an occupation’s share
of employment impact the imported content of the occupation rather than testing
whether imports affect employment.
Equation 3.2 is a cross-section of occupations across states. To understand the
intuition behind equation 3.2, consider two states and two occupations. Suppose
Michigan initially has a higher share of auto workers than construction workers, while
Florida employs a higher share of construction workers than auto workers. Both
occupations were negatively affected by the recession, auto workers by the near-
bankruptcy of the auto industry and construction workers by the collapse of the
housing bubble. Suppose, however, that auto workers were more severely affected
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by the recession than construction workers, i.e. experienced a larger decline in the
share of their occupation in state employment. The regressions in this paper are
testing whether Michigan?s imports of goods related to auto workers increase by
more than Florida?s imports of goods related to construction workers. A negative sign
on the occupation share coefficient confirms that employment changes and imports
related to the occupation move in opposite directions, suggesting that occupations
that experienced large declines do in fact experience larger increases in imports.
Because trade flows, even modified to measure occupation content, are endoge-
nously determined with employment changes, I use two stage least squares (2SLS)
estimation to test for a causal relationship between changes in the structure of em-
ployment in a state and the occupation content of imports. I construct a Bartik
instrument variable to use to instrument for ∆lnOccSharesjt.
Bartiksj =
Empsj,2007∑
sEmpsj,2007
∗ (ln(Empj,2009)− ln(Empj,2007)) (3.3)
The Bartik instrumented is comprised of two terms, the national shock to em-
ployment of occupation j, measured as the change in the natural log employment
from 2007 to 2009, and the initial share of national employment of occupation j that
belongs to state s in 2007. The shift share composition of the Bartik instrument,
where the national shock to an occupation is apportioned to a state based on the
state’s share of employment, captures the impact of national changes in employment
of various types of occupations in a particular state. Looking back to the changes in
employment of various occupation groups in Figure 3·2, the national shock to pro-
duction, construction and sales occupations will be negative, while the shock to the
high and low skill services occupations group will be positive. A shock to a particular
occupation will have a larger effect in states where the initial share of that occupation
is high.
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The first stage regresses the Bartik instrument on ∆OccSharesjt. The second
stage regresses the change in the occupation content of imports ∆OccImpsjt on the
predicted value of ∆OccSharesjt from the first stage.
An identifying assumption is necessary. In order to satisfy the exclusion restric-
tion, the national shock to an occupation during the recession cannot impact the
occupation content of imports, except through the effect of the national shock, which
is the change in the share of the occupation’s employment in a state, ∆OccSharesj.
Given the construction of the occupation content of imports, which uses 2005 employ-
ment values to weight imports, this assumption may not be valid if 2005 employment
levels are correlated with employment in 2007 and 2009. Thus, all 2SLS should be in-
terpreted as suggestive of possible causation between changes in a state’s employment
and changes in its imported occupation content.
3.5 Results
Do changes in the structure of employment impact the occupation content of imports?
Results for OLS and 2SLS estimations are presented in Table 3.2. All standard
errors are clustered at the occupation level. All 2SLS specifications use Bartiksj to
instrument forOccSharesj,2007−09. Column (1) presents OLS results. The coefficient is
negative and significant. Column (2) adds region fixed effects to the OLS specification
to control for region-specific trends in the occupation content of imports. While the
magnitude of the coefficient doesn’t change much, it loses significance.
Columns (3) and (4) present 2SLS results. The coefficient in column (3) with-
out region fixed effects is negative and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient
indicates that a one percent decrease in an occupation’s share of employment in a
state results in a 0.23 percent increase in the occupation content. Again, however,
when region fixed effects are added the specification, the significance of the coefficient
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Table 3.2: Effect of employment changes on occupation content of
imports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆OccImp ∆OccImp ∆OccImp ∆OccImp
∆OccShare -0.12∗ -0.11 -0.23∗ -0.17
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)
Specification OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Region FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 3886 3886 3886 3886
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the occupation level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
disappears.
The results in Table 3.2 indicate that while there may be a negative correlation
between the occupation content of imports and the change in the share of an oc-
cupation’s employment during the recession, there is no evidence that changes in
employment cause changes in the occupation content of imports, particularly when
controlling for region-specific trends that influence imports. Additionally, as men-
tioned in the previous section, the 2SLS results need to be interpreted cautiously
because the construction of the Bartik instrument includes a data series that is also
included in the construction of occupation content on the left hand side. Further-
more, although the t statistic on the coefficient on ∆OccShare in the first stage are
strong, the F statistics for the first stage specifications in columns (3) and (4) are
around the generally accepted cutoff value of 11, indicating Bartik is not strongly
correlated with ∆OccShare and might be a weak instrument.
It is possible, however, that including all occupation groups in the regressions
as Table 3.2 does is not the correct sample over which to estimate the impact of
employment changes on the occupation content of imports. The import data used in
this analysis are imports of merchandise goods, which are primarily processed food
or primary products and manufactured goods, i.e. physical goods. The occupations
most likely to be related to imports of merchandise goods are those occupations that
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are production jobs.
Table 3.3: Effect of employment changes on occupation content of
imports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆OccImp ∆OccImp ∆OccImp ∆OccImp
∆OccShare -0.10∗ -0.07 -0.21 -0.20
(0.06) (0.06) (0.31) (0.30)
Specification OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Region FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1390 1390 1390 1390
Standard errors in are parentheses and clustered at the occupation level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.3 reproduces the regressions in Table 3.2 using only those observations
where occupation j belongs to the aggregate group of production occupations. The
results display a similar pattern as the results in the larger sample. While there is a
negative correlation between changes in an occupation’s share of employment and the
occupation content of imports, there is no evidence that there is a causal relationship.
The coefficients on both 2SLS specifications are not significant, although again the
first stage F statistics are low enough that the instrument can be considered weak.
Region-specific trends are again important. Interestingly, Table 3.3 indicates that the
negative relationship might be more significant among all groups of occupations than
in just production occupations.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose a hypothesis for why imports rebounded after the Great
Recession but polarization of employment deepened. Specifically, I propose that
there was an increase in imported content related to occupations that experienced
employment declines during the recession. I construct a measure of the occupation
content of imports, the dollar value of imports that can be attributed to a particular
occupation, and relate changes in the share of employment of an occupation in a
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state with changes in the occupation content of imports. I find evidence of a negative
relationship between changes in an occupation’s employment share in a state and the
state’s occupation content of imports, but the evidence is not sufficient to establish
a causal relationship.
The lack of causal evidence might be due to my specific empirical strategy that
uses a cross section of occupations across states and the use of employment data in the
construction of several terms on both the left and right hand side, making it difficulty
to remove the endogeneity between imports and employment. It is also possible that
state and region-specific trends, e.g. a state’s continued need to import steel due to
the lack of sufficient in-state steel production, are more important than the changes
in the structure of a state’s employment that occurred during the recession. While
the results presented in this paper are not sufficient to establish a causal relation-
ship between occupation content and changes in employment, the construction and
description of the occupation content of imports are a novel addition to the literature
on trade and employment and warrants further study in a different empirical setting.
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Appendix A
Additional tables
Table A.1: Classification of IP-related provisions in Chile’s multilat-
eral FTAs
HS-6 Code Classification
300110 Biologic
300120 Biologic
300190 Biologic
300210 Biologic
300220 Biologic
300230 Biologic
300290 Biologic
300310 No
300320 No
300331 Biologic
300339 No
300340 No
300390 No
300410 No
300420 No
300431 Biologic
300432 No
300439 No
300440 No
300450 No
300490 No
300510 No
300590 No
300610 No
300620 No
300630 No
300640 No
300650 No
300660 No
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